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CASENOTE

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia: A Constitutional Right of
Access
The public's right to attend a criminal trial, and the coronary
right of the press to report what goes on there,' may be widely
recognized as critical to a free society,' may claim its roots in the
earliest days of the English common law,8 and yet, before the recent decision of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,4 was af1. "A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news. The
full flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee would
be severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the process by
which news is assembled and disseminated." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
2. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 587 (1976) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (Openness "contributes to public understanding of the rule of law and
to comprehension of the functioning of the entire criminal justice system."); Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 616 (1960) (The public trial provision of the
sixth amendment reflects the common law notion that "justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice."); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 16 (1954) (Society's
criminal process must "satisfy the appearance of justice."); Maryland v. Baltimore
Radio Show, Inc., 338 U.S. 912, 920 (1950) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) ("One of
the demands of a democratic society is that the public should know what goes on
in courts .

.

."); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 361 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,

concurring) ("[T]he public have a deep interest in trials.").
Early English commentators also acknowledged the palliative and educational benefits derived from open criminal proceedings. See, e.g., 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 372-73 (2d ed. rev. 1872); 1 J.
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827); M. HALE, THE HISTORY
OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (6th ed. 1820). Retribution is another interest
served by open proceedings. See H. WEIHOFEN, THE URGE To PUNISH (1956);
Mueller, Problems Posed by Publicity to Crime and Criminal Proceedings,110 U.
PA. L. REV. 1 (1961).
3. Even before the Norman conquest of England in 1066, the Anglo-Saxons
had conducted their criminal trials by compurgation and ordeal in public. The
Normans, who introduced the jury system, maintained the public nature of the
old system. See F. POLLACK, THE EXPANSION OF THE COMMON LAW 140 (1904); W.
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAWS (4th ed. 1927); 2 E. COKE, INSTITUTES
OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (6th ed. 1681).

4. 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980).
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forded absolutely no constitutional protection.5 The Richmond
Court explicitly held that the right to attend criminal trials is implicitly guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments.' A
constitutional right of access to other governmental proceedings
and institutions has not yet been identified, even though there is a
5. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 379-80 (1979) ("The Constitu-

tion nowhere mentions any right of access to a criminal trial on the part of the
public; its guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the accused.");
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 848 (1975) ("IT]he specific guarantees of the
Sixth Amendment are personal to the accused.") (Blackmun, J., dissenting). However, the Court has frequently stated that the guarantee is for the benefit of the
accused without specifically denying its applicability to the public at large. Estes
v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). The lack
of constitutional support for the public's right to attend criminal trials has been
noted by several commentators, see, e.g., Radin, The Right to a Public Trial, 6
TEMPLE L.Q. 381 (1932); Note, The Right to Attend Criminal Hearings, 78

COLUM. L. REV. 1308 (1978); Note, The Right to a Public Trial in Criminal Cases,
41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1138 (1966).

However, a constitutional right to attend criminal trials has been supported
in some federal courts. See United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir.
1978); United States ex rel. Mayberry v. Yeager, 321 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J. 1971);
United States v. Kobli (3d Cir. 1949).
6. 100 S.Ct. at 2829 ("We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment. .

.

. [Tlhere was a guaranteed

right of the public under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to attend the
trial ...

").

The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . ." U.S. CONST. amend I. The freedoms were applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment, Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (assumes incorporation), and have been classed by
the Court as fundamental personal rights and liberties, Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936). "The phrase is not to be lightly used. It reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitution that exercise of the rights lies
at the foundation of free government by free men." Schneider v. Irvington, 308
U.S. 147, 161 (1939).
7. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("[T]his Court repeatedly has held that there is no First Amendment right
of access in the public or the press to judicial or other governmental proceedings."). See also Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 608-10
(1978); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring)
("The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of
access to information generated or controlled by the government . . ."); Pell v.

Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965);
Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 546 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958); Tribune Review Pub. Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958).
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constitutionally recognized public right to know.'
This note will analyze Richmond and, in light of earlier access
cases decided by the Court,' discuss the nature of the right created
and possible judicial approaches to future access claims both in
and out of the courtroom setting.
THE HISTORICAL SETTING FOR A RIGHT OF ACCESS
INFORMATION

To

The claim that there was a "newsman's privilege" protecting
sources of information from governmental interference was made
as early as the 1950's,10 but was not considered by the Supreme
8. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Linmark Assoc.

v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394
U.S. 557 (1969); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); See generally Emerson, Legal Foundations of the
Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 1; Note, The ConstitutionalRight to Know, 4
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 109 (1977).
9. See note 7, supra. In Richmond the Court made no distinction between
the "right of access" and the "right to gather information."
It is not crucial whether we describe this right to attend criminal trials to
hear, see, and communnicate observations concerning them as a 'right of
access,' cf. Gannett, supra, 443 U.S. at 397, 99 S.Ct., at 2914 (Powell, J.,
concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 94 S.Ct. 2811,
41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41
L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), or a 'right to gather information,' for we have recognized that 'without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of
the press could be eviscerated.' Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681, 92
S.Ct. 2646, 2656, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). The explicit, guaranteed rights
to speak and to publish concerning whit takes place at a trial would lose
much meaning if access to observe the trial could, as it was here, be foreclosed arbitrarily.
100 S. Ct. at 2827.
10. The issue of the existence of a constitutional privilege protecting the reporter's ability to gather news was initially raised and denied in Garland v. Torre,
259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 910 (1958). Earlier, newsmen had
been generally unsuccessful in their attempt to establish a common law privilege
in the federal courts, see, e.g., Brewster v. Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 20
F.R.D. 416 (D. Mass. 1957). See also G. BIRD & F. MERWIN, THE PRESS AND SOCIETY 592 (1971); Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709 (1975); Murasky, The Journalist'sPrivilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEx. L. REV. 829 (1974); Blasi, The
Newsman's Privilege:An Empirical Study, 70 MICH. L. REV. 229 (1970); Guest &
Stanzler, The Constitutional Argument for Newsmen Concealing Their Sources,
64 Nw.U.L. REV. 18 (1969); Note, Reporter's Privilege - Guardianof the People's
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Court until 1972 when Branzburg v. Hayes was decided. 1" Although the issue raised did not involve the affirmative duty on the
part of the government to provide information to the public or
press,' 2 the Court indicated that news gathering did qualify for
first amendment protection.' 8 The Branzburg opinions "did not
explore (the right) enough to clarify their conceptions of its
scope,"" but the Court clearly announced that any recognized
right of access by the press was no greater than that held by the
public." Since the Court did not find that the first amendment
Right to Know?, 11 NEW ENG. L. REv. 405 (1976); Comment, The Newsman's
Privilege:Government Investigations,Criminal Prosecutions and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198 (1970); Note, Reporters and Their Sources: The Constitutional Right to a Confidential Relationship, 80 YALE L.J. 317 (1970).
The creation of testimonial privileges has frequently met with disfavor, since
such privileges act as obstructions in the search for truth. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE §2192 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 2 Z. CHAFFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS
COMMUNICATIONS 496-97 (1947); Morgan, Foreward,MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 2230 (1942).
11. 408 U.S. 665 (1972). See generally V. BLASI, PRESS SUBPOENAS: AN EMPIRICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS (1972).
One earlier case did come close to recognizing the right to gather information,
however, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965) ("The right to speak and publish
does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information"). "The necessary implication is that some right to gather information does exist." 408 U.S. at
728 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The right to gather information before the Branzburg decision is discussed in
Note, The Right of the Press to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838
(1971).
12. "The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to appear and
testify before state or federal juries abridges the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not." 408 U.S. at 667.
13. "Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not qualify for First
Amendment protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 408 U.S. at 681; "Finally as we have earlier indicated, news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections
. .." Id. at 707; "A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather
news." Id. at 727 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
See also Emerson, Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH. U.
L.Q. 1; Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974).
14. Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather Information After
Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. Rv. 166, 177 (1975).
15. It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not
available to the public generally. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17, 14
L.Ed.2d 179, 189-191, 85 S.Ct. 1271 (1965); New York Times Co. v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728-730, 29 L.Ed.2d 822, 832-834, 91 S.Ct.
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protection of news gathering extended to protect the confidentiality of a newsman's sources from revelation to a grand jury' "it
does not invalidate every
[was] clear that the First Amendment
17
incidental burdening of the press."
2140 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring); Tribune Review Publishing Co. v.
Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 885 (CA3 1958); In the Matter of United Press
Assn. v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 77, 123 N.E.2d 777, 778 (1954).
408 U.S. at 684.
"Newsmen have no constitutional right of access to the scenes of crime or
disaster when the general public is excluded.. ." Id. at 684-85.
Later cases, including Richmond, have also refused to recognize a right of
special press access as an aspect of freedom of the press, 100 S. Ct. at 2825 ("the
media enjoys the same right of access to criminal trials as the public")(emphasis
added); Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1, 16 (1978) ("[T]he media have no
special right of access to the Alameda County Jail different from or greater than
that accorded the public generally."); Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435
U.S. 589, 609 (1978) ("The First Amendment generally grants the press no right
to information about a trial superior to that of the general public."); Pell v.
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974) ("[N]ewsmen have no constitutional right of
access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public."); accord Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974).
For further detailed discussion of the complex problems surrounding press
access and press immunities see Van Alstyne, Comment: The Hazards to the
Press of Claiming a 'PreferredPosition', 28 HASTINGS L.J. 761 (1977); Stewart, Or
of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975); Nimmer, Introduction - Is Freedom of
the Press A Redundancy: What Does it Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 639 (1975); Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 77
(1975); Nimmer, Speech and Press: A Brief Reply, 23 U.C.L.A.. L. REv. 120
(1975); Comment, Has Branzburg Buried the Underground Press?, 8 HAnv. C.R. C.L. L. REV. 181, 184-85 (1973); Note, Public and Press Rights of Access to Prisoners After Branzburg and Mandel, 82 YALE L.J. 1337 (1973).
Interestingly, though the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to recognize
special press privileges, it has mentioned that the press may have special responsibilities, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560 ("The extraordinary protections afforded by the First Amendment carry with them something in
the nature of a fiduciary duty to exercise the protected rights responsibly...").
16. "Thus, we cannot seriously entertain the notion that the First Amendment protects a newsman's agreement to conceal the criminal conduct of his
source . . ." 408 U.S. at 692.
17. Id. at 682.
The Court had previously approved other incidental burdens on the asserted
freedom of the press. Newspapers are not exempt from the requirements of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §151 et seq. (1976), according to Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); nor from the application of the Fair
Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §201 et seq. (1976), Oklahoma Press Publishing
Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946); nor from the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 et
seq. (1976), Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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The next right of access cases to be considered by the Court
were Pell v. Procunier" and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co."
These companion cases, both authored by Justice Stewart,20 rejected the claim that limitations on interviews with prison inmates

violated the press right to gather news. 1 While the precedential

value of these cases may be limited because of the unique charac-

teristics of a prison environment," it should be noted that two
concepts from Branzburg were reiterated: (1) that there was some
constitutional protection for news gathering,

8

but (2) that the

press had no greater right of access than that of the public

18. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
19. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
20. In Pell, Justice Stewart's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices White, Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice Powell dissented from that part
of the opinion which held that an absolute ban against prisoner-press interviews
did not abridge the news media representatives' freedom of the press because the
regulation in question did not deny the media access to sources of information
available to members of the general public. Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented.
The same five member majority found Saxbe "constitutionally indistinguishable from Pell v. Procunier," 417 U.S. 843 at 850. Justices Douglas, Brennan and
Marshall repeated their dissent in Pell. Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall
dissented, based on the view that prohibition of all prisoner-press interviews negated the press' ability to discharge its function of informing the people of the
conduct of government.
21. Specifically, the majority in both Pell and Saxbe held that since the press
was not denied access to sources of information available to the general public, a
regulation which prohibited interviews with individual inmates did not violate the
first and fourteenth amendments. 417 U.S. 817 at 835; 417 U.S. 843 at 850.
22. The Court recognized that the "internal problems of state prisons involve
issues . . . peculiarly within state authority and expertise," 417 U.S. 817 at 826
citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973), and that courts should ordinarily defer to the judgment of prison officials, 417 U.S. 817 at 827. Thus, a restriction on prison access or news gathering may be a constitutionally permissible
"time, place and manner regulation" which is "necessary to further significant
governmental interests." Id. at 826; Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
115 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 536, 554-55 (1965); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 398 (1953); Cox
v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575-76 (1941). "This limitation on visitations is
justified by '. . . the truism that prisons are institutions where public access is
generally limited.'" 417 U.S. 843 at 849.
23. 417 U.S. 817 at 833. Pell and Saxbe are discussed in Note, PrisonRegulation ProhibitingInterviews Between Newsmen and Inmates Held Constitutional,
60 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1975); Note, A Giant Step Backwards: The Supreme
Court Speaks Out on Prisoners'First Amendment Rights, 70 Nw.U.L. REV. 352
(1975).
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generally. 4
The Court considered, and denied, a third prison access claim
four years later in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.'5 Rejecting an asserted
right to enter a prison facility completely off-limits to the public,"
the Court emphasized equality of access as the constitutional
norm, 27 and cautioned that Branzburg would be of little assistance
where government had made a legislative or administrative determination to keep out both the public and the media.28 The
Houchins opinion seemed to indicate that the Constitution would
only prohibit the government from interfering with the channel of
communication between the news reporter and the news source,
and would never compel government itself to become a source."
24. See note 15, supra.
25. 438 U.S. 1 (1978). The Court's unusual three to one to three split did
result in some relief for the media respondents, however. "Equal but effective
access" was sanctioned.
Chief Justice Burger announced the judgment of the Court that the first and
fourteenth amendments do not provide the press with a right of access in excess
of that of the public. His opinion was joined by Justices White and Rehnquist.
Justices Brennan and Powell dissented, based on the belief that Saxbe and Pell
did not sanction the denial of all information to the public. Id. at 28-29 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Stewart's critical vote determined that once admitted, the
press was entitled to the reasonable use of cameras and other equipment.
"[Tierms of access that are reasonably imposed on individual members of the
public may, if they impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to the general public what the visitors see." Id. at 17 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
26. 438 U.S. at 3-4.
27. "The issue is a claimed special privilege of access which the Court rejected in Pell and Saxbe, a right which is not essential to guarantee the freedom
to communicate or publish." Id. at 12.
28. "Whether the government should open penal institutions ... is a question of policy which a legislative body might appropriately resolve one way or the
other." Id. "There is no constitutional right to have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy." Id. at 14, citing
Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 636 (1975).
The treatment of the Branzburg language that "news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections," 408 U.S. at 707, is noteworthy. Characterizing the words as dictum, the Court said that this "in no sense implied a constitutional right of access to news sources." 438 U.S. at 10.
29. In its discussion of Branzburg's limited scope the Court observed that
although there is a "right to gather news from any source by means within the
law," 408 U.S. at 681-82, 438 U.S. at 11, this "affords no basis for the claim that
the First Amendment compels others-private persons or government-to supply
information." Id.
Further support for this limited interpretation of the right to gather news at
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While acknowledging the important role the media plays as "eyes
and ears" 0 of the public, it was also noted that there was no way
to compel the press to be society's mouthpiece. 8 ' Therefore, any
the time of the Houchins decision is found in its discussion of two cases relied
upon by the media respondents, Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233
(1936) and Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966). Both Grosjean (invalidating a
state tax on advertising revenues of newspapers) and Mills (striking down a statute making it a crime to publish an editorial about election issues on election day)
are noted as illustrative only of the right to publish information which has already
been obtained - the doctrine of prior restraint. 438 U.S. at 9-10.
Basically, a prior restraint is a governmental order which limits or prohibits
the dissemination of information already in the hands of the speaker. Prior restraints have been called "the most serious and least tolerable infringement on
First Amendment rights," Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559
(1976), and "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 832 (1974); 427 U.S. at 558; New York Times Co. v. United States,
403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
418-19 (1971); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968); Bantam Books,
Inc. v. Sullivan 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963). Cf. Near v. Minnesota. 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
For a more thorough discussion of the doctrine of prior restraint see generally Barnett, The Puzzle of PriorRestraint, 29 STAN. L. REv. 539 (1977); Murphy,
The PriorRestraint Doctrine in the Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 51 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 898 (1976); Emerson, The Doctrine of PriorRestraint, 20 LAW & CON-

TEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).

30. 438 U.S. at 8.
31. The Court noted that there is no way to compel the press to publish information after it is acquired. While public officers may be coerced by public
opinion to make disclosures, there is no comparable pressure available to make
the press speak. Id. at 14. And, although a governmental policy of fair coverage
and mandated access to the media is constitutionally permissible when applied to
the broadcast media, see Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969),
it is not so when applied to the press, see Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418
U.S. 241 (1974). However, even when applied to the airwaves only, the right of
access to the media is subject to strict limitations which serve to protect the
broadcasters' editorial discretion. Cf. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (refusing to sell advertising
time constitutionally permissible). Conversely, a newspaper is not free from all
editorial interference., cf. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376 (1973) (upholding a ban on newspaper advertising specifying a preference for males or for females as prospective employees).
It is not completely clear whether the right is one of access or rather the right
to receive information. See, e.g., Van Alstyne, The Mobius Strip of the First
Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.L. REV. 539 (1978); Bollinger,
Freedom of Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of PartialRegulation of
the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976); Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A CriticalReview and Assessment, 52
N.C.L. REV. 1 (1973); Jaffe, The EditorialResponsibility of the Broadcaster:Re-
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right to know of conditions in penal institutions does not implicate
a right of access 2 when the legislature has made a policy decision
that there is a more appropriate method of disseminating
information. 8
The explanations in Branzburg, Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins of
what the right of access-or right to gather informations8 -is not,
supported some Justices' denials that any constitutional status had
been recognized.83 The constitutional protections sought by those
interested in acquiring newsworthy material were apparently to be
flections on Fairnessand Accuracy, 85 HAzv. L. REV. 768 (1972); Malone, Broadcasting, The Reluctant Dragon: Will the First Amendment End the Suppressing
of Controversial Ideas?, 5 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 194 (1972); Barron, Access-The
Only Choice for the Media?, 48 TEx. L. REV. 766 (1970); Firestein, Red Lion and
the Fairness Doctrine: Regulation of Broadcasting "In the Public Interest", 11
ARMz. L. REV. 807 (1969); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment
Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967). See also T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE
EXPRESSION 671 (1970).
32. 438 U.S. at 12-14. There is language in Chief Justice Burger's opinion
which might indicate that the Constitution would compel the legislature to choose
some method of providing the public with some information "essential for informed public debate on jail conditions." Id. at 13.
The Respondents' argument .

.

. invites the Court to involve itself in

what is clearly a legislative task which the Constitution has left to the
political processes. Whether the government should open penal institutions in the manner sought by respondents is a question of policy which
a legislative body might appropriately resolve one way or the other.
Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
"I cannot agree with petitioners that the inmates' visitation and telephone
privileges were reasonable alternative means of informing the public at large
about conditions within Santa Rita." Id. at 26 n. 14 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"Both [Zemel v. Rusk and Branzburg v. Hayes] imply that there is a right to
acquire knowledge that derives protection from the First Amendment." Id. at 28
n.15 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, it is possible to read both opinions as support
for the contention that, in spite of language to the contrary (see notes 27-29 and
accompanying text, supra), Houchins requires some information be provided to
the public.
33. Possible alternatives listed include: citizen task forces and prison visitation committees; grand juries; prosecutorial, judicial or legislative inquiries. Id. at
12-13.
34. See note 9, supra.
35. The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public
a right of access to information generated or controlled by government,
nor do they guarantee the press any basic right of access superior to that
of the public generally. The Constitution does no more than assure the
public and press equal access once government has opened its doors.
438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). Accord 438 U.S. at 15
(per Burger, C.J.). See also note 5, supra.
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confined to limited circumstances, if not totally repudiated in the
future.36
Where the first amendment failed to open doors to the press
and public, the sixth amendment" fared no better. In Gannett Co.
88 the petitioner, a
v. DePasquale,
publisher of two New York newspapers, asserted the right to attend a pre-trial hearing in a locally
notorious murder trial. The hearing had been closed upon the defendants' unopposed motion. 9 The Supreme Court affirmed the
New York Court of Appeals' decision that the defendants' right to
a fair trial 40 balanced against the public's interest in open judicial
36. Justice Stevens observed that the no-access policy in Houchins could
only survive constitutional scrutiny if there were no public right to the information sought. Id. at 30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI reads in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
• . ." James Madison proposed the fair trial guarantee to Congress when the Bill

of Rights was considered. F.

HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
TION OF THE UNITED STATES 30 (1951).

To

THE CONSTITU-

Each of several guarantees in the sixth amendment has been held applicable
to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Kloper
v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948) (public trial); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961) (impartial jury).
38. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
39. Id. at 375.
40. The fair trial guaranteed by the sixth amendment (see note 37 supra)
may be impaired by press attempts to inform the public about the criminal justice
system. The verdict must be based upon evidence developed at the trial, not induced by outside influence. Irvin v. Dodd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961); Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907). Cf. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 726
(1963) (publicity may be so pervasive so as to render "any subsequent court proceedings . . . a hollow formality."); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 271 (1941)
("Legal trials are not like elections, to be won through the use of the meeting hall,
the radio, and the newspaper."). Further, the defendant is entitled to be tried in
an atmosphere of "judicial calm," Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 536 (1965) (televising trial denied defendant due process of law). But see Chandler v. Florida, 101
S. Ct. 802 (1981) (holding that televising a trial over defendant's objection is not
per se unconstitutional).
In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), where the defendant's murder
conviction was overturned due to the prejudicial effect of the trial's "carnival atmosphere," Id. at 358, the Court listed several measures that can be used by the
trial judge to protect the fair trial right: rules governing the use of the courtroom
and the conduct of newsmen, insulation of the witnesses, control of extrajudicial
statements, intensive voir dire examination, sequestration, continuance, change of
venue. Id. at 357-63. The absence of closure as an alternative is noteworthy.
On the other hand, the press has been acknowledged as playing a crucial role
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proceedings, permitted closure."' Justice Stewart's majority opinion relied on the petitioner's sixth amendment claim of a right to
attend criminal proceedings rather than on the first amendment
claim.' 2 The Court held that the right was intended to inure only
in the judicial system.
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . ..The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against
the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the policy, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive scrutiny and criticism.
Id. at 350.
The American Bar Association has proposed model guidelines which recommend that certain prejudicial information voluntarily not be released by the bar
and press. ABA, LEGAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS
VOLUNTARY AGREEMENTS

9 (1974).

Chief Justice Burger's position in Nebraska Press was expressed somewhat
differently in Richmond when, in discussing the free press-fair trial conflict, he
referred to "the defendant's superior right to a fair trial." 100 S. Ct. at 2821
(emphasis added).
41. The decision appealed from is reported at 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d 544,
401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977).
Although the Court reserves the first amendment claim of the petitioners (see
infra notes 42-44 and accompanying text) the balancing of interests at the trial
court was noted with approval. 443 U.S. at 393. Balancing has been the traditional
method of resolving first versus sixth amendment conflicts because, as Justice
Frankfurter expressed in Pennekamp v. Florida, "A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press.
Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensible to a free society." 328
U.S. 331, 355 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). More recently, the Court has
refused to assign a priority to one of the amendments because:
The authors of the Bill of Rights did not undertake to assign priorities as
between First Amendment and Sixth Amendment rights, ranking one as
superior to the other. . .[11f the authors of these guarantees, fully aware
of the potential conflicts between them, were unwilling or unable to resolve the issue by assigning to one priority over the other, it is not for us
to rewrite the Constitution by undertaking what they declined to do.
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 561 (1976) (per Burger, C.J.). See
also Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794 (1975); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965).
Justice Douglas, on the other hand, maintained that the framers had placed
the first amendment in a superior position. "[All of the 'balancing' was done by
those who wrote the Bill of Rights. By casting the First Amendment in absolute
terms, they repudiated the timid, watered-down, emasculated versions of the First
Amendment . . ." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.
CT. REV. 245.
42. 443 U.S. at 379-84, 387-91.
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to the benefit of the accused4' and specifically (and confusingly)
reserved the question of the first amendment's application."
The decision caused widespread consternation among lower
courts'5 and commentators,' and most remarkedly, spawned an
Justice Stewart's opinion, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell,

Rehnquist, and Stevens asserted that "assuming arguendo" that the first and
fourteenth amendments guaranteed "access in some situations" the trial judge's

actions were consistent with such rights. First, counsel for the petitioner was
given an opportunity to voice objections to closure, despite petitioner's failure to
make a contemporaneous objection. Second, the trial judge balanced the putative
first amendment rights against the defendant's right to a fair trial. Third, the
denial of access was only temporary and a transcript was made available "once
the danger of prejudice had dissipated." 443 U.S. at 392-93.
Chief Justice Burger, writing separately, emphasized that the sixth amendment holding of the majority applied to pre-trial hearings with no mention of the
first or fourteenth amendments. Id. at 394-97 (Burger, C. J., concurring).
Justice Powell, also writing separately, chose to address the question reserved
by the majority, and stated that petitioners did have a first and fourteenth
amendment right to be present at the pre-trial hearing. The procedure followed,
however, "fully comported with that required by the Constitution." Id. at 403
(Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Rehnquist in another concurring opinion, suggested that "[b]ecause
this Court has refused to find a First Amendment right of access in the past,
lower courts should not assume that after today's decision they must adhere to
the procedures employed by the trial court in this case . . .in order to avoid
running afoul of the First Amendment." Id. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
The dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun joined by Justices Brennan,
White and Marshall, rejected the first amendment analysis, but found that the
right to attend judicial proceedings was grounded in the sixth amendment. Id. at
411 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id. at 381.
44. Id. at 392.
Even if there were an enforceable first amendment right, however, Justice
Stewart said that the trial court, in balancing the competing interests involved,
had adequately met any constitutional requirements.
It should be noted that the first amendment argument was the primary one
offered by the petitioner newspaper. Brief of the Petitioner at 11-34.
45. See, e.g., State ex rel. Feeney v. District Court of the 7th Judicial District, 607 P.2d 1259 (Wyo. 1980) (closing pre-trial hearing with no finding that
less drastic means would suffice and over prosecution's objection); State v. Hicks,
No. 5003 (Md. Cir. Ct. 1979) (rape trial closed entirely); State v. Woomer, No. 79GS-26-203 (S.C. Cir. Ct. 1979) (press but not public excluded from murder trial).
46. See, e.g., Stephenson, Fair Trial-Free Press: Rights in Continuing
Conflict, 46 Brooklyn L. Rev. 39, 63 (1979) ("intended reach of the majority opinion is unclear" (footnote omitted)); The Supreme Court, 1978
Term, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 60, 65 (1979) ("widespread uncertainty over what
the Court held"); Note, 51 Colo. L. Rev. 425, 432-433 (1980) ("Gannett
can be interpreted to santion the closing of trials"; citing "the uncer-
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unprecedented wave of extra judicial comments by the Justices.47
"The primary cause of uncertainty [lay] in Justice Stewart's majority opinion, which was ambiguous in two important ways. First,
his alternative sixth amendment analysis [left] unclear whether the
holding [extended] to trials or merely to pretrial hearing ....
Second, the majority failed to explicate its first amendment holdtainty of the language in Gannett," and its "ambiguous Sixth Amendment holding"); Note, 11 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 159, 170-171 (1979) ("perhaps much of the present and imminent confusion lies in the Court's own
statement of its holding"); Borow and Kruth, Closed Preliminary Hearings, 55 Calif. State Bar J. 18, 23 (1980) ("Despite the public disclaimers
...,the majority holding appears to embrace the right of access to trials
as well as pre-trial hearings"); Goodale, Gannett Means What it Says;
But Who Knows What it Says? Nat'l Law J., Oct. 15, 1979, at 20; see also
Keefe, The Boner Called Gannett, 66 A.B.A. J. 227 (1980).
The press-perhaps the segment of society most profoundly affected
by Gannett-hascalled the Court's decision "cloudy," Birmingham PostHerald, Aug. 21, 1979, at A4; "confused," Chicago Sun-Times, Sept. 20,
1979, at 56 (cartoon); "incoherent," Baltimore Sun, Sept. 22, 1979, at
A141; "mushy," Washington Post, Aug. 10, 1979, at A15; and a "muddle," Time, Sept. 17, 1979 at 82, and Newsweek, Aug. 27, 1979, at 69.
100 S.Ct. at 2841-42, nn.1&2 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
47. The first such comments were made by Chief Justice Burger on August 8 in an interview with, ironically, a reporter from the Gannett News
Service. He was quoted as saying, "[T]he opinion referred to pre-trial
proceedings only." N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1979, at A17, col. I. Three weeks
later, Justice Blackmun, who dissented in Gannett, told a group of federal judges in South Dakota that "despite what my colleague, the Chief
Justice, has said, "the opinion authorized the closing of all trials," N.Y.
Times, Sept. 4, 1979, at A15, col. I. On September 8, Justice Stevens,
speaking at dedication ceremonies for the University of Arizona College
of Law, said that "the normal reason for an in camera proceeding is to
prevent the jury from having access to inadmissible matter; that reason
could not possibly motivate an order excluding the public from the proceedings that take place in the presence of the jury," thereby implying
that he too would limit Gannett to pre-trial proceedings. N.Y. Times,
Sept. 9, 1979, at A41, col. I. On August 13, Justice Powell, speaking at
the American Bar Association's annual meeting in Dallas, suggested that
judges might be "a bit premature" in interpreting Gannett to allow exclusion of the press from full trials while allowing other members of the
public to remain. N.Y. Times, Aug. 14, 1979, at A13, col. I; N.Y. Times,
Sept. 4, 1979, at A15, col. I. Such extrajudicial debate is wholly unprecedented and seems improper, for it runs the risk of superseding the opinion itself. See Note, Extra-judicialActivity of Supreme Court Justices,
22 Stan. L. Rev. 587, 601-03 (1970).
Note, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term, 93 HARV. L. REV. 62, 65, n.32 (1979).
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ing."' Not unlike in Branzburg and its progeny,4 ' the Court, while
recognizing the possible existence of some first amendment claim,
nonetheless declined to find any violation of the right. This left the
press, public, and courts with no workable guidelines for either asserting or adjudicating constitutional news gathering or access
claims in the federal forum.50 Further, the setting of Gannett-the
criminal courtroom-made the ambiquity all the more intriguing.
While Branzburg, Saxbe, Pell, and Houchins had involved places
traditionally closed or of limited access to the press and public,"1
the Gannett Court acknowledged that the "general desirability of
open judicial proceedings ' '15 was a factor to be weighed in the balance. 53 Because the Constitution did not enumerate a right to at48. Id. at 65-66.
49. See notes 11-36 and accompanying text, supra.
50. It should be noted that lack of constitutional support did not leave interested persons with no way of gaining entry to a courtroom. The Supreme Court
has authority to exercise supervisory powers and establish standards of procedure
in the federal court system, McNabb v. United States, 381 U.S. 332 (1943). See
generally Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 76
HARV. L. REv. 1656 (1963).
For a summary of pre-Gannett state case law barring closure except to protect the defendant's interest in a fair trial derived from state constitutions or
common law see 93 HARv. L. REv. at 70, n.59.
At least two post-Gannett state courts have refused to apply Gannett and
have held that their state constitutions prohibited closure under such circumstances, Shiras v. Britt, Ark. -,
589 S.W.2d 18 (1979) (applying Ark. Stat.
Ann. §22-109 (repl. 1962) which states: "The settings of every court shall be public, and every person may freely attend the same."); Great Falls Tribune v. District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, 608 P.2d 116 (Mont. 1980) (holding
that although the press has no federal constitutional right of access to a pre-trial
motion to suppress, the Montana Constitution (Art. II §9) (1972) does guarantee
such a right).
51. Houchins, Saxbe, and Pell all involved the asserted rigl4 to enter, investigate and interview in prisons. See notes 11-36 and accompanying text, supra.
52. 443 U.S. at 393.
The Court noted but declined to comment upon the constitutional distinction. "The petitioner argues that trials have traditionally been open to the public,
in contrast to prisons from which the public has been traditionally excluded. We
need not decide in this case whether this factual difference is of any constitutional
significance." Id. at 392 n.24.
53. Id. at 392.
See also Id. at 394 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (designating the open trial as
"an important prophylaxis of the system of justice that constitutes the adhesive
element of our society."); Id. at 397 (Powell, J., concurring) (stating that, because
of the importance of the public understanding the criminal justice system, there is
a first amendment right of access); Id. at 405-06 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (while
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tend trials, however, a tradition of openness was not enough to require constitutional recognition. The Court observed that "[n]ot
many common-law rules have been elevated to the status of constitutional rights, 5 4 and held that "members of the public have no
constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to attend criminal trials."5 5 Thus, the first and fourteenth amendment putative rights of access were to be given no further definition or scope in this case, despite the urging of the petitioner "to
narrow [the] rulings in Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins, at least to the
extent of recognizing a First and Fourteenth Amendment right to
attend criminal trials."' It is not surprising that Justice Rehnquist, in concurring in the opinion of the Court, expressed the view
that no first amendment right of access had been recognized in
s
Gannett nor in past cases.5
A RIGHT OF AcCESS IN Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
Justice Rehnquist's belief that the Court had not and would
not recognize access to information as a dimension of the first
amendment was proved incorrect with the Richmond decision the
following year. Chief Justice Burger saw the case as being one of
first impression and stated that "here for the first time the Court
is asked to decide whether a criminal trial itself may be closed to
the public upon the unopposed request of a defendant, without
any demonstration that closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some other overriding
consideration requires closure."58 Seven of the justices agreed with
the narrow holding of the plurality opinion that "the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the guarantees of the First
Amendment." 5' Tantalizing language throughout the plurality and
there is no first or sixth amendment right of access there is an interest in an open
trial which lower courts are free to accomodate or not in a way that they choose);
Id. at 412 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (observing
that it is part of the criminal justice tradition that the trial is a public event).
54. Id. at 384.
55. Id. at 391.
56. Id. at 392.
57. Saxbe, Pell and Branzburg are all cited as authority for this proposition
as well as Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); and Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
58. 100 S.Ct. at 2821.
59. Id. at 2829. The Chief Justice was joined in his opinion by Justices White
and Stevens and announced only the judgment of the Court. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justice Marshall concurred in the judgment. Justice Stewart, concurring
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concurring opinions indicates that the right of access will not be
limited to criminal trials.60 Yet, in light of the prior access casesel
and the lack of agreement within the Richmond Court which is
indicated by the multiplicity of opinions, it seems clear that "the
First Amendment is [not] some sort of constitutional 'sunshine
law.' "S2
The Facts Of Richmond
In 1976, John Paul Stevenson was indicted, tried and convicted of the murder of a hotel manager in the Circuit Court of
Hanover County, Virginia. The Virginia Supreme Court reversed
the conviction" due to improperly admitted evidence. Stevenson's
second and third trials ended in mistrials. A fourth trial in the
same circuit court began in 1978 and was covered by reporters for
appellant Richmond Newspapers. Before the commencement of
the proceedings, however, defendant's counsel moved to close the
trial to the public "because [he did not] want any information being shuffled back and forth when [the court was in] recess as to
what-who testified to what."" Basing his authority on Virginia
in the judgment, wrote separately as did Justice Blackmun. Justice Rehnquist
dissented, while Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of
the case.
60. "Whether the public has a right to attend trials of civil cases is a question
not raised by this case, but we note that historically both civil and criminal trials
have been presumptively open."; Id., at 2829, n.17. "The right of access to places
traditionally open to the public... may be seen as assured by the amalgam of
the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press. . ." Id. at 2828 (emphasis
added). "Today, however, for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an
arbitrary interference with access to important information is an abridgment of
the freedoms of speech and of the press protected by the First Amendment." Id.,
at 2831 (Stevens, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
"Read with care and in context, our decisions must therefore be understood
as holding only that any privilege of access to governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated by the nature of the information and countervailing interests in security and confidentiality." Id., at 2833 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (emphasis added).
"[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments clearly give the press and the public a right of access to trials themselves, civil as well as criminal." Id. at 2840
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
61. See text accompanying notes 11-36, supra.
62. 443 U.S. 368, 405 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
63. Stevenson v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 462, 237 S.E.2d 779 (1977).
64. Transcript of Sept. 11, 1978 Hearing on Defendant's Motion to Close
Trial to the Public, 2-3 [hereinafter cited as Transcript].
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Code §19.2-266,15 the trial judge closed the trial after ascertaining
that the prosecution had no objection to the- closure order.
Appellants requested a hearing on a motion to vacate the order the same day it was entered which was granted, but the hearing was ordered closed as part of the trial. Appellants' counsel argued that the order was invalidly entered because of the absence of
evidentiary findings, and the court's failure to consider less drastic
measures mandated by constitutional considerations." The court
declined the motion to vacate, agreeing with the defense counsel
that closure was proper "if the rights of the defendant [to a fair
trial] are infringed in any way."6 After the Virginia Supreme
Court dismissed the appellants' mandamus and prohibition petitions as well as the petition for appeal," the Supreme Court of the
United States agreed to a hearing of the case on the merits.6
The Court's Decision
In announcing the judgment of the Court,70 Chief Justice Bur65. In pertinent part, Virginia Code §19.2-266 states that: "In the trial of all
criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the court may,
in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would impair
the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial
shall not be violated."
66. Transcript at 11-12. Less drastic measures as described by the Court in
Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966), must be considered before a trial court
can "gag" the press, see Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); see
also notes 29 & 40, supra.

67. Transcript at 20.
68. The judgments of the Virginia Supreme Court dismissing the appellants'
petitions for writs of mandamus and prohibition and refusing the petition for appeal are unreported.
69. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 444 U.S. 896 (1979).
70. When a majority of the Court cannot agree upon a single rationale to
support an agreed-upon judgment, the result is often a plurality opinion. This is
the lead opinion, not necessarily the one that commands the largest number of
votes. All other opinions agreeing with the judgment are concurrences. Particularly in complicated areas, the plurality may serve as a request for help from more
experienced lower courts. Of course, since precedential weight depends upon the
soundness of an opinion's reasoning and the number of justices in agreement, true
"landmark" cases may not be clearly identifiable until one of the ratio decidendi
wins approval of a clear five member majority.
Where, as in Richmond, the opinions in support of the judgment are of different scope and breadth, the Supreme Court has indicated that the opinion which
expresses the narrowest grounds in support of the judgment is probably the highest common denominator of majority agreement, and should be considered as authoritative in future cases. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). (Gregg was a 3-
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ger answered the "narrow question presented" 1 affirmatively. He
stated that the first and fourteenth amendments guarantee the
right to attend criminal trials.7 The Gannett decision was distinguished both for its sixth amendment grounding, and because it
involved a pre-trial proceeding rather than a trial.78 Relying upon
legal history to determine the fundamental public character of the
criminal trial, 74 the Chief Justice noted that, when the constitution
was adopted, "criminal trials both here and in England had long
been presumptively open." 76
The constitutional sources for the access claim were found in
the first amendment protections for speech, press, and assembly.
These protections "share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government."' "6 Since the Chief Justice believed that "it would be
2-1-1-2 plurality decision compared to Richmond's 3-2-1-1-1 split).
An excellent article on the value and interpretation of plurality opinions is
Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 COLUM.
L. REV. 756 (1980).
71. "The narrow question presented is whether the right of the public and
press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed under the United States Constitution." 100 S. Ct. at 2818.
72. Id. at 2829.
73. The appellants contended that this distinction was highly significant and
made Gannett distinguishable. Brief of the Appellant at 49-51.
74. The Chief Justice states that throughout history, the nexus between
openness, fairness, and the perception of fairness has been recognized. Id. at 2824.
See notes 2 & 3 and accompanying text, supra. This historical analysis would
support the right to attend civil trials as well. In 1685, Sir John Hawles, Solicitor
General, stated: "The reason that all matters of law are, or ought to be transacted
publicly, is, [t]hat justice may be done ...

[and] .

.

. that truth may be discov-

ered in civil as well as criminal matters." Remarks Upon Mr. Cornish's Trial, 11
How. St. Tr. 455, 460 (1685).
The communication of what goes on at trial today is usually dependent on
the media which "(i]n a sense .

.

. validates the media claim of functioning as

surrogates for the public." Id. at 2825. Cf. Chandler v. Florida, 101 S. Ct. 802
(1981) (televising trials not inherently unconstitutional) and Houchins v. KQED,
438 U.S. 1 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring) (media entitled to effective access).
75. Id. at 2823.
76. Id. at 2827.
The ninth amendment was also cited as both constitutional and historical
support for the proposition that the first amendment's affirmation of some particular rights did not imply the negation of others. Id. at 2829, n.15.
The ninth amendment reads: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
The history of the ninth amendment is reported at 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES
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difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern
and importance to the people than the manner in which criminal
trials are conducted,"7 7 the first amendment could be read "as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning
to those explicit guarantees. ' 7 Thus, the right to attend trials
"implicit in the guarantees of the First
could be found
79
Amendment."
The trial judge in this case "made no findings to support closure; no inquiry was made as to whether alternative solutions
would have met the need to ensure fairness; there was no recognition of any right under the Constitution for the public or press to
'
attend the trial."8 0 The "tested alternatives"" are available at trial
8 2 "to satisfy the Conbut not in the Gannett pre-trial proceeding
83
stitutional demands of fairness." These alternatives make trial
"[a]bsent an overriding interest articuclosure unconstitutional
' 's
8
findings.
lated in
Justice White, while joining the opinion of the Chief Justice,
maintained that had Gannett been correctly decided, the first
86
amendment issue would not have had to be addressed. Justice
Stevens also wrote a separate concurrence to emphasize the "watershed" nature of the case, believing that the Court had recogs
nized a right of access to "newsworthy matter." He suggested
that the Court had adopted the positions expressed by Justice
87
Powell in Saxbe and by himself in Houchins.
(Hunt ed. 1904).
77. 100 S. Ct. at 2827.

MADISON 271

78. Id.

79. Id. at 2829.
80. Id. at 2829-30.
81. Alternatives to closure suggested by the Chief Justice include exclusion
or sequestration of witnesses and jury sequestration. See the alternatives suggested by the Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell at note 40, supra. See also Nebraska
Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 563-65 (1976).
82. The problems with publicity in the pre-trial proceedings are discussed in
Note, The Right to Attend Pretrial Criminal Proceedings: Free Press, Public
Trial and Priorities in Curbing Pretrial Publicity, 28 SYRACUSE L. REv. 875
(1977).
83. 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
84. Id. These "overriding interests" will be discussed infra at notes 132-38
and accompanying text.
85. Id. (White, J., concurring). As a member of the Gannett minority, Justice
White believed that the right of access derived from the sixth amendment.
86. Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
87. Id. at 2831. See notes 20 & 23, supra.
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Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan joined by Justice
Marshall, agreed that the first amendment guarantees "an independent right of access to trial proceedings. '"8 He argued that the
prior access cases had not categorically ruled out a right of access,
but had merely demonstrated that "any privilege of access to governmental information is subject to a degree of restraint dictated

by the nature of the information and contervailing interests in se-

curity or confidentiality."89
The Court's approach in the earlier cases "simply reflects the
special nature of a claim of First Amendment right to gather infor-

mation," 90 according to Justice Brennan. Unlike the almost absolute protection interposed to protect speaker and listener,s ' "an as-

sertion of the prerogative to gather information must . . . be

assayed by considering the information sought and the opposing

interests invaded."'i
Justice Brennan sees the first amendment as fostering more
than expression and communication. "[I]t has a structural role to
play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government." 9 Both "the principle that debate on public issues should

be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"

and the assumption that

88. Id. at 2832 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
89. Id. at 2833.
90. Id.

91. Id. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) and New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) are cited as authority for this
proposition.
92. 100 S. Ct. at 2834. (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). The treatment of an asserted right to gather information should be analogous to the "somewhat cautious" application of first amendment protections to nonverbal communication. Id. n.5. Compare Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969) and United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The speech-conduct distinction has been
the subject of much discussion. See, e.g., Ely, Flag Desecration:A Case Study in

the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARv. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Henkin, Forward: On Drawing Lines, HARV. L. REv.,
63 (1968).
93. 100 S.Ct. at 2833 (emphasis in original).
See Brennan, Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176 (1979). The structural
model relies on Justice Stone's famous Carolene footnote. The note favors an interventionist role for the Court when "legislation appears on its face to be within
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments . . ." or when it restricts a political process. Unites States v. Carolene

Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
94. 100 S.Ct. at 2833 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) quoting New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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the debate must be informed, are implicit in the structural
model."9 The protections for this aspect of communication are limited. "[W]hat is crucial in individual cases is whether access to a
particular government process is important in terms of that very
process."" According to Justice Brennan, public access is an indis7
pensable element of the trial process itself."'
Justice Stewart, also concurring in the judgment, stated that
the first and fourteenth amendments give the public and press a
right to attend criminal and civil trials.'8 The military base,"
jail,100 and prison 0 1 are not public places, unlike a trial courtroom. 1'" However, Justice Stewart states that the trial court may
impose "reasonable limitations" upon the occupancy of the courtroom to accomodate physical limitations, the requirements of order
0 8
and decorum, or the demands of a fair trial."
Justice Blackmun expressed displeasure with the "veritable
potpourri" of constitutional sources found by the plurality, 104 and
reiterated his belief, expressed in Gannett, that the right of access
to trials derives from the sixth amendment.' 0 ' As a "secondary position,"'" Justice Blackmun agreed that the trial closure was violative of the first amendment.
The sole dissenter, Justice Rehnquist, repeated his Gannett
position on the sixth amendment, and denied a right of access
stemming from either the first or ninth amendments.10 Additionally, he expressed the opinion that the Court was, in reversing
state court closure orders, "[smothering] a healthy pluralism which
would ordinarily exist in a national government embracing 50
95. 100 S. Ct. at 2833 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
96. Id. at 2834 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Brennan
also stated that "the case for a right of access has special force when drawn from
an enduring and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information." Id.
97. Id. at 2839 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
98. Id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
99. See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
100. See also Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
101. See also Pell, Saxbe and Houchins discussed in notes 18-36 and accompanying text, supra.
102. 100 S. Ct. 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 2843 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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States."10
ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S DECISION

While the Court definitively recognized a first amendment
right of access to criminal trials,10 ' the precedential value of the
decision beyond its narrowest scope is difficult to predict.110 The
opinion of Chief Justice Burger"'1 heavily relies on a historical
analysis consistent with the traditionally open versus closed approach suggested by the earlier access cases.' 2 Additionally, the
plurality opinion stresses the important sociological function of
open trials, characterizing them as having "significant community
therapeutic value" by providing society with an acceptable outlet
for venting emotional outrage, preventing "self-help", and satisfying the urge for retribution.118 Open trials also contribute to an
understanding of the criminal justice system.1"'
Other Richmond opinions indicate that the historical-sociological analysis may be employed in later access cases.1"" A majority
of the Court, thus, agree that these factors will in some way be
determinative of when the public or press may assert a right to
gather information. Interestingly, the Court had previously rejected this particular analytical framework as recently as the Gannett decision.116
108. Id.

109. "The right of access to places traditionally open to the public, as criminal trials have long been, may be seen as assured by the amalgam of the First
Amendment guarantees of speech and press; and their affinity to the right of assembly is not without relevance." 100 S. Ct. at 2828.
110. See note 70, upra.
111. 100 S. Ct. at 2818-30.
112. Id. at 2823. "The historical evidence demonstrates conclusively that at
the time when our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open." See also note 3, supra.
113. Id. at 2824-25. See also note 2, supra.
114. Id. at 2825.
115. Id. at 2933-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); Id. at 2840
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment); Id. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., concurring in
the judgment).
116. 443 U.S. at 384-87. The Gannett Court stated, for example, that "history however, ultimately demonstrates no more than the existence of a commonlaw rule of open civil and criminal proceedings.
"Although the Court in Gannett gave a modicum of lip service to legal history. . . it denied its obvious application when the defense and the prosecution,
with no resistance by the trial judge, agreed that the proceeding should be
closed." 100 S. Ct. at 2841 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
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If the Court does choose to rely on a historical-structural analysis, the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan offers an interesting balancing test for operationalizing the model." 7 If accepted by
the Court in the future, the right of access defined in Richmond
could be extended to claims stemming from closures in settings
other than courtrooms. Two factors, both the historical tradition of
openness and the importance of public observation to the proper
functioning of the institution itself would be weighed against the
countervailing interests which would support closure. 1"' Failure of
the plurality (or any other three justices) to either adopt this test
or to clearly acknowledge an extensive right of access indicates
that, at least at the time the decision was handed down, a majority
of the Court was reluctant to commit themselves to a broad
application."'
The plurality's use of precedent further complicates analysis
of the case. Of all the prior access cases 20 only Gannett is clearly
distinguished.'' The earlier cases are only obliquely referred to"'2
although the concurring justices do deal with the implications of
this decision on the earlier opinions. 1' The plethora of opinions
117. Id. at 2834. See text accompanying notes 89 & 96, supra.
118. "[R]esolution of First Amendment public access claims in individual
cases must be strongly influenced by the weight of historical practice and by an
assessment of the specific structural value of public access in the circumstances
.. . [W]hat countervailing interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse
this presumption of openness need not concern us now." Id. at 2839 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
In other words, two factors, both the historical tradition of openness and the
importance of public observation to the proper functioning of the institution itself
would be weighed against the countervailing interests which would support closure. Justice Brennan has declined to speculate as to what other interests would
be sufficient to tip the balance in favor of closure.
119. 100 S. Ct. at 2829 ("We hold that the right to attend criminal trials is
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment. . ."); Id. at 2840 (Stewart, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (It is only clear that there is a first and fourteenth
amendment right of access to trials); Id. at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("[W]ith the Sixth Amendment set to one side in this case, I am driven
to conclude, as a secondary position, that the First Amendment must provide
some measure of protection for public access to the trial.").
120. See text accompanying notes 13-56, supra.
121. 100 S. Ct. at 2821; Id. at 2831, n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
122. Id. at 2827 where the Court refers to Pell, Saxbe, Branzburg, and Gannett in connection with the interchangeability of "right of access" and "right to
gather information." See note 9, supra.
123. Id. at 2830-31 (Stevens, J., concurring); Id. at 2833-36 and n.18 at 2836
(Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). All apparently agreed that this deci-
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impact
may be largely due to this disagreement over the decision's
12 4
on past holdings and its possible future application.
The future of access claims will depend upon the Justices'
conceptions of the scope of the right created.2 5 An indication of
the possible difficulty in forming majorities in the future is seen by
comparing both the language and judicial alignment in Gannett
and Richmond. 12
sion is not totally inconsistent with the prior holdings.

124. The Chief Justice's opinion does not address the question of the impact
of Richmond on the past access cases. Justice Stevens believed that the Richmond
decision is consistent with Gannett, Id. at 2831, n.2, but limits Saxbe and
Houchins. Justice Brennan states that "read with care and in context" the prior
decision may now be understood as holding that access is subject to a balancing of
countervailing interests, Id. at 2833. Justice Stewart considers only Gannett and
finds it limited to sixth amendment claims, Id. at 2839-40. Justice Blackmun sees
Gannett now holding that "there is no Sixth Amendment right on the part of the
public-or the press-to an open hearing on a motion to suppress." Id. at 2842
(emphasis in original).
125. The plurality opinion frames the issue (100 S.Ct. at 2821) and holding
(Id. at 2829) in terms of the criminal trial. On the other hand, the use of the
words "places traditionally open to the public" (Id. at 2828) certainly hints that
the right might be extended to the civil trial, (Id. at 2829, n.17) traditionally open
administrative agency meetings, or the meetings of local governing bodies, for
example.
Justices Stevens, Marshall, and Brennan apparently would allow greater access rights than the narrowest grounds expressed in this case. See 100 S.Ct. at
2830-31 (Stevens, J., concurring). The opinion of Justice Blackmun (Id. at 283940) appears to apply only to judicial processes with Justice Stewart's position on
the pre-trial unclear ("whatever the ultimate answer to that question may be with
respect to pre-trial suppression hearings . . ." Id. at 2840).
It is interesting that Justice Stevens joined the plurality rather than the
Brennan concurrence. This can be interpreted as a disagreement with the suggested standard to be applied to closure as expressed by Justice Brennan. The
"uncertainty [marking] the nature-and strictness of the standard of closure the
Court adopts" (Id. at 2842) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) will be
discussed infra at notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
126. For example, the majority in Gannett (Justices Stewart, Burger, Powell,
Rehnquist and Stevens) state that historical support does not elevate an expectation [of openness] to constitutional status and merely acknowledged a public interest in open judicial proceedings. See 443 U.S. at 384-87 and n.15 at 386. In
Richmond only Justice Rehnquist retains this belief, see 100 S.Ct. at 2842-44
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The plurality opinion (in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Stevens joined) is replete with references to the close relationship
between tradition, intent of the framers of the Constitution and fundamental
rights deserving constitutional protections. It is, therefore, questionable as to how
the five members of the Gannett Court would align themselves in a case of access
to a non-judicial setting where there is a tradition of openness, or in a case involv-
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Thus, it is difficult to ascertain where a line will be drawn between places and situations where access is required and where it
may be denied. In failing to agree in all but the judgment, and
declining to address the impact on past precedent, the Court has
left open two possible future courses of action. First, Richmond
may be interpreted as applying only to arbitrarily closed criminal
trials. Second, the case may be later read as defining another "important but unarticulated right"12 7 as the plurality suggests. Given
this more expansive interpretation, later Courts may use Richmond as authority for opening any number of proceedings or other
sources of information to the public and press. At least one commentator 128 has dubbed the decision a constitutional "sunshine
law" in spite of Justice Rehnquist's earlier denial of any such judiing a first amendment right of access claim in a judicial setting other than the
criminal trial.
The Gannett dissenters, (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White and Marshall)

may also divide ranks as indicated by Richmond. Justices Blackmun and White

apparently only reluctantly accept the first amendment route to open judicial proceedings and would much prefer the sixth amendment course. See 100 S.Ct. at
2839 (White, J., concurring) and at 2842 (Blackmun, J., concurri-.g in the judgment). Therefore, the scope of the first amendment right in their views was not
clarified, though Justice White was author of the Branzburg opinion in which it
was stated that "news gathering [qualifies] for First Amendment protection." 408
U.S. at 681.
127. 100 S. Ct. at 2829. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(holding that the right of privacy of a married couple prevents the state from
regulating the use of contraceptives); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S.
678 (holding that the right protects individual decisions in all matters of
childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the state); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557 (1969) (right of privacy protects possession of obscene materials); see Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary, and Intimate Decision, 64
CALIF. L. REV. 1447 (1976) (in which the right to privacy was defined as freedom
from unwanted stimuli, protection against intrusive observation, and autonomy in
personal life choices).
See Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868) (invalidating a state tax
on passengers leaving the state on common carriers as an unconstitutional restriction on interstate travel); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964)
(prohibiting members of Communist Party from obtaining passports requires an
unconstitutional choice between the rights of travel and association).
See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding
that a civil contempt judgment against the NAACP for refusing to disclose its
membership list violated freedom of association); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
(1976) (holding that the practice of patronage dismissals is violative of the rights
of political belief and association).
128. Goodale, Gannett is Burned by Richmond's First Amendment 'Sunshine Act', NAT'L L.J. (Sept. 29, 1980).
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cial creation. 1"9
POTENTIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE

Richmond DECISION

Until the court speaks further on the right of access, the right
can only be examined in terms of the courtroom. The procedural
requirements that must be met before closure is permissible were
not clearly delineated, nor were trials and pretrial proceedings adequately distinguished.
A court will definitely be required to make some sort of findings in which it is demonstrated that "closure is required to protect the defendant's superior right to a fair trial, or that some
other overriding consideration requires closure."130 The plurality
speaks of a presumption of openness 31 but gives no indication of
precisely what will be required to overcome the presumption, if
this is to be the nature of the right. This does imply, however, that
the burden of proof will be on the defendant to show that a fair
trial would be jeopardized without closure.
An idea of what "overriding interests" in addition to the accused's sixth amendment right to a fair trial would permit closure
may be gleaned from the opinions. Several of the Justices mention
"courtroom decorum."'1 '8 Necessary limitations imposed by court-

room size are also mentioned."38 The preservation of national security'8 4 and trade secrets'8 5 are also listed. Embarrassment of the
129. 443 U.S. at 405 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
130. 100 S. Ct. at 2821. The plurality states that "[albsent an overriding interest articulated in findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the
public." Id. at 2830. Justice Stevens concluded that "[tihe absence of any articulated reason for the closure order is a sufficient basis for distinguishing this case
from [Gannett]." Id. at 2831, n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring). "[Tihe statute here
authorizes trial closures at the unfettered discretion of the judges and parties.
Accordingly, Va. Code §19.2-266 violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments
• . ." Id. at 2839 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment); "Since in the present
case the trial judge appears to have given no recognition to the right . . . the
judgment under review must be reversed." Id. at 2841 (Stewart, J., concurring in
the judgment).
131. Id. at 2825.
132. Id. at 2830, n.18; Id. at 2839, n.23 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). Id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
133. Id. Significantly, with size limitations, Justice Stewart's "effective access" concurrence in Houchins (438 U.S. at 16) is cited with approval. Courts may
be required to give the press preferred seating and "priority of entry." Id. at 2825.
Id. at 2830, n.18; Id. at 2840 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment).
134. Id. at 2839 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). See also United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 714-16 (1974).
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public or witnesses, 136 offensive evidence,1 37 and interest in confidentiality" 8 have previously justified closures and might be approved by the Court.
The plurality also mentions that the trial judge made no inquiry "as to whether alternative solutions would have met the need
to ensure fairness." 1 39 The Court cites Nebraska Press Association
v. Stuart'" for examples of "tested alternatives to satisfy the conAccording to the plurality, witstitutional demand of fairness."''
ness exclusion or sequestration and juror sequestration are preferable to closure." 2 Other "tested alternatives" suggested in Nebraska
Press include change of venue, change of venire, and continuance. 43 However, some of these alternatives are more intrusive
than others. Whether all or any particular alternatives would have
to be required to "[inquire] . . . as to whether alternative solutions
would meet the need to ensure fairness""' will not be known until
the Court comes to some agreement as to the test that will be
applied.
In examining the language of both Gannett and Richmond,
the Justices' lack of agreement as to what standard should be applied in closure cases emerges as a major source of difficulty. The
Gannett dissent1 48 suggested that, under the sixth amendment ap135. Id. at 2841 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). See also Stamicarbon, N.V. v. American Cyanimid Co., 506 F.2d 532, 539-42 (2d Cir. 1974).
136. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Latimore v. Sielaff, 561 F.2d 691 (7th Cir.
1977); United States ex rel. Smallwood v. LaValle, 377 F. Supp. 1148 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff'd without opinion, 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 920
(1975).
137. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Laws v. Yeager, 448 F.2d 74 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 976 (1971); Lancaster v. United States, 293 F.2d 519 (D.C.
Cir. 1961).
138. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lloyd v. Vincent, 570 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.)
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975) (exclusion of public during testimony of undercover police officer); United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 991 (1972) (exclusion of public when hijacker's profile entered at pretrial suppression hearing).
139. 100 S.Ct. at 2830.
140. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
141. 100 S. Ct. at 2830.
142. Id. A copy of the trial transcript would probably not be a viable alternative. Id. at 2839, n.22 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
143. 427 U.S. at 563-65.
144. 100 S. Ct. at 2829-30.
145. Justices Blackmun, White, Marshall and Brennan made up the minority
in Gannett.
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proach, an accused must establish that closure is "strictly and inescapably necessary" in order to protect the fair trial guarantee. " 6 It
does not appear that a lesser standard would be acceptable to
those Justices who dissented in Gannett under a first amendment
approach. Justices Brennan and Marshall clearly continue to support the higher standard. First, their use of the word "compelling '"1 7 in Richmond indicates the high value they place upon the
stature of the right of access. Apparently, not any governmental
interest would justify closure. Second, the opinion respectfully
cites Justice Stone's famous "Carolene Footnote" 4 s and proceeds
to establish that the trial is an important aspect of the structure
and functioning of government.'" It is possible that the Gannett
dissenters, all of whom seem to stand behind their "strict necessity" test, differ more upon the scope of the right-how far it extends beyond the courtroom-than on the particular test to be employed in reviewing access to court proceedings cases. Vis-A-vis
trial closure, their ability to obtain a fifth (majority) vote remains
to be seen.150
Since the right of access is recognized as an aspect of free
speech,151 there are good reasons to apply the higher standard of
review. First, though "free speech" is usually applied between a
willing speaker and listener, the right to receive information and
ideas " ' would be greatly hampered by any interference with the
original link in the chain, the gathering of the information and
ideas to be disseminated. Admittedly, there is a strong interest in a
fair trial. Both the defendant and society expect criminal trials
free from disruptions caused by the presence of the public and the
146. 443 U.S. at 440 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
147. "What countervailing interests might be sufficiently compelling to reverse this presumption of openness need not concern us now ... " 100 S. Ct. at
2839.

148. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).

See note 93, supra.
149. 100 S. Ct. at 2833-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
150. Justice Stevens, in marking Richmond as a "watershed" case (Id. at

2830) and in his apparent willingness to give the right broad application, seems

the most likely candidate. Justice Powell specifically rejected this approach in
Gannett. 443 U.S. at 399.

151. Id. at 2826-27.
152. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); see generally note
8, supra.
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press. 6 ' But, it is nonetheless consistent with this expectation to
require that a reasonably high degree of probability exists that the
sixth amendment right will be injured by the exercise of the first
before closure is permitted.
Second, restrictions on access function similarly to prior restraints.'1 There is some support for this comparison in the lower
courts' 55 even though the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected
the analogy." 6 Protections afforded speech between speaker and
listener should be invoked at the earliest possible stage in any protected communication context in order to give full meaning to the
protections. And, unlike a classic prior restraint situation, information cannot be disseminated at all if it cannot be gathered.
CONCLUSION

Although Richmond has the potential to be a landmark case,
its ultimate significance will have to be determined by its later use
and interpretation. The right of access may encompass a right to
attend a wide spectrum of governmental proceedings. As a right to
gather information, it is possible that it may become a judge-made
"sunshine act," giving a broad right to gather information in the
hands of the government. But, even if limited in application to judicial proceedings, -this new right gives constitutional definition
and protection to the role of the public and the press in the orderly
administration of justice.
BEVERLY VASSAR

153. See discussion at note 40, supra.

HAAS

154. See note 29, supra.
155. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 55 App. Div. 2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719
(1976) (closure order constituted an unlawful prior restraint in violation of the
first and fourteenth amendments); Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 383
So.2d 236, 238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) ("[W]e would prefer to include the press
at all hearings and then gag them if required.").
156. See 443 U.S. 399 (Powell, J., concurring); Id. at 411 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

